



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

B5

FILE: [REDACTED]
SRC 06 195 51633

Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date:

JUL 11 2007

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[REDACTED]

EXHIBIT COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Maura Deadrick
fr Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a professional staffing company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a software engineer pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. As required by statute, the petition was accompanied by certification from the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence. The new evidence cannot entirely overcome the director's concerns. Moreover, the director did not address whether the beneficiary qualifies for the classification sought. Thus, even if we found that the petitioner had overcome the director's concerns, and we do not, we would need to remand the matter for consideration as to whether the beneficiary is qualified for the classification sought.

Ability to Pay

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing on April 6, 2006. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$93,808 annually. On Part K of the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner from August to November 2005.

On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have an establishment date in 2003, a gross annual income of \$700,000, an undisclosed net income and seven employees. In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted a quarterly wage and withholding report for the third quarter of 2005 reflecting seven employees in each month and wages of \$3,159 paid to the beneficiary and unaudited financial statements for 2005.

Because the director deemed the evidence submitted insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, on June 23, 2006 and again on September 29, 2006, the director requested additional evidence pertinent to that ability. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

In response, the petitioner submitted its Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Returns for the petitioner for 2005 and unaudited financial statements for the first six months of 2006. The financial statements and tax return reflect the following information:

	2005 (financial statement)	2005 (tax return)	2006 (Jan. - June)
Net income	\$56,813	\$27,690	\$25,785.95
Current Assets	\$83,203	\$6,215	\$79,113.40
Current Liabilities	\$26,746	\$0	\$44,728.33
Net current assets	\$56,457	\$6,215	\$34,385.07

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, and, on October 23, 2006, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel acknowledges that the petitioner's net income and net current assets cannot demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, but asserts that a review of the petitioner's complete circumstances, including a contract for the beneficiary's services, warrants a favorable finding on this issue. The petitioner submits the Forms W-2 Wage and Tax Statements it issued in 2005 and several contracts for services, including a contract dated April 5, 2006 for the beneficiary's services. The beneficiary's Form W-2 reveals that the petitioner paid him \$9,034 in 2005.

The unaudited financial statements that counsel submitted with the petition are not persuasive evidence. According to the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), where the petitioner relies on financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's financial condition and ability to pay the proffered wage, those statements must be audited. Unaudited statements are the unsupported representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not persuasive evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Moreover, as is apparent from the numbers listed above, the petitioner's financial statements are not consistent with its tax returns.

Where the petitioner has submitted the requisite initial documentation required in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during the relevant period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay

the proffered wage. In the instant case, while not presumptive evidence of an inability to pay the proffered wage, the petitioner paid the beneficiary only \$9,034 in 2005.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. We reject, however, any argument that the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.¹ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d). Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16(d) through 18(d). If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets.

¹ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

As noted by the director, the petitioner shows a net income of only \$27,690, net current assets of only \$6,215 and has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the difference between the wage paid and the proffered wage out of its net income or net current assets.

Counsel does not challenge the director's analysis of the petitioner's tax return. Rather, counsel asserts that we should consider that the owners have previously lent money to the petitioner and that the petitioner has secured a contract for the beneficiary's services and that the payments to the petitioner for the beneficiary's services under this contract would cover the proffered wage.

Counsel's reliance on the ability of the owners to loan money to the petitioner is not persuasive. A corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners or stockholders. *See Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980); *Matter of Aphrodite Investments Limited*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980); *Matter of M-*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958; A.G. 1958). CIS will not consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage. *See Sitar Restaurant v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713, *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 18, 2003). Moreover, the mere fact that the owners have previously lent money to the company does not establish their ability to do so in the future.

The contract with V Group, Inc. for the beneficiary's services does suggest that the beneficiary could generate income for the petitioner, which can be taken into account. The contract is for eight months at \$65 per hour. The wage is more than the proffered wage. That said, the contract provides that the petitioner will be responsible for federal and state income taxes, FICA, federal and state unemployment insurance contributions and state disability insurance premiums from the fees paid by V Group. The petitioner is also responsible for paying workers' compensation and comprehensive liability insurance coverage. These costs are unknown. As such, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the \$65 per hour would cover the proffered wage in addition to these costs. Moreover, the record contains no evidence that V Group is a viable company. The petitioner cannot simply shift its burden of being able to pay the proffered wage to a company of unknown financial status.

As stated above, the petitioner's net income and net current assets in 2005 are insufficient to pay the difference between the wage paid and the proffered wage. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date.

Classification as a Member of the Professions with an Advanced Degree

Even if we found that the petitioner had overcome the director's grounds for denial, we would need to remand the matter for an analysis of whether the beneficiary qualifies for the classification sought. Regardless, we are not precluded from raising a new ground of ineligibility on appeal. Specifically, an application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis).

For the reasons discussed below, we find that decisions by federal circuit courts, which are binding on this office, have upheld our authority to evaluate whether the beneficiary is qualified for the classification sought.²

In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. An advanced degree is a United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above the baccalaureate level. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The regulation further states: “A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master’s degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree.” *Id.*

The beneficiary possesses a foreign three-year bachelor’s degree and is a Fellow of the Institute of Electronics and Telecommunication Engineers. Thus, the issues are whether either credential is a foreign degree equivalent to a U.S. baccalaureate degree.

As noted above, the ETA Form 9089 in this matter is certified by DOL. Thus, at the outset, it is useful to discuss DOL’s role in this process. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act provides:

In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-

(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and

(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

According to 20 C.F.R. § 656.1(a), the purpose and scope of the regulations regarding labor certification are as follows:

(a) Under section 212(a)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or Act) (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(5)(A)), certain aliens may not obtain immigrant visas for entrance into the United States in order to engage in permanent employment unless the

² Cf. *Hoosier Care, Inc. v. Chertoff*, No. 06-3562 (7th Cir. April 11, 2007) relating to a lesser classification than the one involved in this matter and relying on the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(4), a provision that does not relate to the classification sought.

Secretary of Labor has first certified to the Secretary of State and to the Secretary of Homeland Security that:

- (1) There are not sufficient United States workers who are able, willing, qualified and available at the time of application for a visa and admission into the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform the work; and
- (2) The employment of the alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of United States workers similarly employed.

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to DOL, or the remaining regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether or not the alien is qualified for a specific immigrant classification or even the job offered. This fact has not gone unnoticed by federal circuit courts.

There is no doubt that the authority to make preference classification decisions rests with INS. The language of section 204 cannot be read otherwise. *See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS*, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In turn, DOL has the authority to make the two determinations listed in section 212(a)(14) [current section 212(a)(5)].³ *Id.* at 423. The necessary result of these two grants of authority is that section 212(a)[(5)] determinations are not subject to review by INS absent fraud or willful misrepresentation, but all matters relating to preference classification eligibility not expressly delegated to DOL remain within INS' authority.

* * *

Given the language of the Act, the totality of the legislative history, and the agencies' own interpretations of their duties under the Act, we must conclude that Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any determinations other than the two stated in section 212(a)[(5)]. If DOL is to analyze alien qualifications, it is for the purpose of "matching" them with those of corresponding United States workers so that it will then be "in a position to meet the requirement of the law," namely the section 212(a)(14) determinations.

Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

The AAO is bound by the Act, agency regulations, precedent decisions of the agency and published decisions from the Circuit Court of Appeals from whatever circuit that the action arose. *See*

³ As amended by Sec. 601, and as further amended by Sec. 172 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978; however, the changes made by Sec. 162(e)(1) were repealed by Sec. 302(e)(6) of the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-323, 105 Stat. 1733, effective as though that paragraph had not been enacted.

N.L.R.B. v. Ashkenazy Property Management Corp., 817 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1987)(administrative agencies are not free to refuse to follow precedent in cases originating within the circuit); *R.L. Inv. Ltd. Partners v. INS*, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (D. Haw. 2000), *aff'd* 273 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2001)(unpublished agency decisions and agency legal memoranda are not binding under the APA, even when they are published in private publications or widely circulated). Even CIS internal memoranda do not establish judicially enforceable rights. See *Loa-Herrera v. Trominski*, 231 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 2000)(An agency's internal guidelines "neither confer upon [plaintiffs] substantive rights nor provide procedures upon which [they] may rely.")

A United States baccalaureate degree is generally found to require four years of education. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. 244 (Reg. Comm. 1977). The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference provides that "[in] considering equivalency in category 2 advanced degrees, it is anticipated that the alien must have a bachelor's degree with at least five years progressive experience in the professions." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 955, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1990, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 1990 WL 201613 at *6786 (October 26, 1990). At the time of enactment in 1990, it had been almost thirteen years since *Matter of Shah*. Congress is presumed to have intended a four-year degree when it stated that an alien "must have a bachelor's degree" when considering equivalency for second preference immigrant visas. We must assume that Congress was aware of the agency's previous treatment of a "bachelor's degree" under the Act when the new classification was enacted and did not intend to alter the agency's interpretation of that term. *Lujan-Armendariz v. INS*, 222 F.3d 728, 748 (9th Cir. 2000) *citing Lorillard v. Pons*, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)(Congress is presumed to be aware of administrative and judicial interpretations).

In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor's degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree:

The Act states that, in order to qualify under the second classification, alien members of the professions must hold "advanced degrees or their equivalent." As the legislative history . . . indicates, the equivalent of an advanced degree is "a bachelor's degree with at least five years progressive experience in the professions." Because neither the Act nor its legislative history indicates that bachelor's or advanced degrees must be United States degrees, the Service will recognize foreign equivalent degrees. But both the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree.*

56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (November 29, 1991)(emphasis added).

The petitioner submitted an evaluation of the beneficiary's credentials that concluded that the beneficiary's three-year baccalaureate "is recognized as equivalent to [a] Bachelor of Engineering (Telecommunication) for purpose of admission to Post Graduate Courses by the Association of Indian Universities and many other recognized Indian universities." The record includes a list of Indian universities that accept this degree for admission to post graduate courses. The evaluation does not assert that the beneficiary's three-year degree is equivalent to a baccalaureate from an accredited college or university in the United States. The evaluation then concludes that the beneficiary's Fellowship is based on his associate membership in the Institution of Electronics and Telecommunication Engineers, which "is the equivalent to a bachelor's degree in the United States. [The beneficiary's] professional education and qualification together are equivalent to a bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering from an accredited university in the United States."

Regarding the petitioner's professional membership, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(i)(A) requires "an official academic record showing that the alien has a United States advanced degree or a foreign equivalent degree." This language reflects that the equivalent credential must be a degree, not a professional membership. The petitioner did not submit a transcript from the Institution of Electronics and Telecommunications Engineers or evidence that it is a degree issuing institution.

There is no provision in the statute or the regulations that would allow a beneficiary to qualify under section 203(b)(2) of the Act with anything less than a full baccalaureate degree. More specifically, a three-year bachelor's degree will not be considered to be the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. at 244. Where the analysis of the beneficiary's credentials relies on work experience alone or a combination of multiple lesser degrees, the result is the "equivalent" of a bachelor's degree rather than a "foreign equivalent degree."

Thus, in order to have experience and education equating to an advanced degree under section 203(b)(2) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree. As noted in the federal register, persons who claim to qualify for an immigrant visa by virtue of education or experience equating to a bachelor's degree will qualify for a visa pursuant to section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act as a skilled worker with more than two years of training and experience.

Because the beneficiary does not have a "United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree," the beneficiary does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(2) of the Act as he does not have the minimum level of education required for the equivalent of an advanced degree.

For the above stated reasons, considered both in sum and as separate grounds for denial, the petition may not be approved. The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.